We show that the introduction of a non-contributory pension program (Pension 65) in Peru had remarkably dierent eects for its three main ethnic groups, i.e., Mestizo, Quechua, and Aymara. The Aymara beneciaries of the program have experienced larger increases in health and life satisfaction compared to other Peruvians. Using a panel life satisfaction regression, we nd evidence for preference heterogeneity between the Aymara and the other ethnic groups that is consistent with the observed dierences. Finally, we turn to the question of how the pension program can be evaluated in a robust manner while respecting the preference heterogeneity between the ethnic groups. We propose the natural criterion that a program benets a recipient if she is lifted to a higher indierence curve. We show that the pension program was benecial for all groups, but that more Aymara beneciaries were lifted to a higher indierence curve compared to other Peruvians. Our proposed criterion can be useful to evaluate programs in all cases where preference dierences matter.
Introduction
In recent decades there has been a growing attention in policy circles for the specic position of indigenous people in the process of development (see, e.g., the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention of the International Labor Organization or the United Nations Declaration 61/295 on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples).
1 There are indeed wide socio-economic gaps between indigenous and non-indigenous citizens. Moreover, indigenous people may have dierent values and preferences, and it has been argued that these dierences should be respected when evaluating their overall situation. Yet, the latter principle seems to have had only a minimal impact on the concrete practice of making program evaluations.
In this paper, we evaluate the eects of the introduction of the Pension 65 program, a non-contributory pension program in Peru. Even though the Pension 65 program is in the rst place an income transfer program, its beneciaries can also receive care in public health facilities at no cost and are eligible for the Integral Health Insurance Plan. Like other Latin American countries, Peru is characterized by a large socio-economic gap between indigenous and nonindigenous people (World Bank, 2015) . We focus on the eects of the policy on the two largest indigenous groups, the Quechua and the Aymara, in comparison with the group of citizens who have a mixed, Mestizo, identity.
To quantify the eects of the Pension 65 program, we use panel data from the Survey of Health and Wellbeing of the Elderly (ESBAM) that was carried out before and after the introduction of the Pension 65 program (in 2012 and 2015) .
2 We use a panel regression dierence-in-dierences estimator exploiting the discontinuity at the eligibility threshold. We compare the beneciaries of the Pension 65 program to a control group of non-beneciaries who are classied as poor, but not as extremely poor and, hence, were not eligible. Remarkably, we nd that the Aymara beneciaries of the Pension 65 program have experienced Although it is common practice in the literature to evaluate the eects of policies dimension by dimension, it is useful to integrate these eects in an overall measure of individual well-being. This integration allows us to make an overall assessment of the program and to shed light on the phenomenon of cumulative deprivation, which arises when the same individuals are deprived in dierent dimensions of life (Ferreira and Lugo, 2013) . One possible candidate for such a measure of individual well-being is self-reported subjective life satisfaction.
We will propose an alternative measure that is solely based on the ordinal preferences of the Peruvians in the dierent ethnic groups, capturing what they themselves consider to be a good life. We say that a program benets a recipient if she is lifted to a higher indierence curve according to her own preferences.
This criterion makes use only of ordinal intra-personal well-being comparisons and does not involve any debatable normative choices that are needed to cardinalize utility in an interpersonally comparable way. It is consistent with various preference-based well-being measures based on quantity metrics or money metrics (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp. 179-182) for a survey).
Following Decancq et al. (2015a; 2015b; , we obtain information about the dierences in preferences between the ethnic groups from a life satisfaction regression (see also Clark and Oswald (2002) ; Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) ).
We nd that the Aymara assign a relatively large weight to health in their conception of a good life. This nding is consistent with the observed heterogeneity in outcomes of the Pension 65 program. It is also in line with some anthropological work on the features of what could be a specic Andean view on the good life (see Smith (2006) on the Quechua, and Calestani (2009) on the Aymara). Calestani (2009) describes the Aymara view on the good life in terms of the basic concepts of suma qamaña (living well together, i.e., in harmony with society) and suma jakaña (living in harmony with oneself ). Even though these idealized constructions do not exist in reality (Artaraz and Calestani, 2015) , they function as a general frame of reference to evaluate the real-world situation. From this perspective, it is to be expected that a non-material life dimension such as health becomes a relatively important component of the good life.
Our analysis is related to several recent contributions. Copestake et al. (2009) give an overview of the mismatch between subjective well-being and simple monetary measures of poverty in Peru, but they do not use the life satisfaction regression to derive information about marginal rates of substitution between 3 dierent life dimensions. Bernal et al. (2017) and Neelsen and O'Donnell (2017) have investigated the impact of the extension of health insurance in Peru (the Integral Health Insurance Plan) on health care access and health care expenditures without including other dimensions of well-being. Olivera and Tournier (2016) use the baseline wave of the ESBAM data to analyze the well-being of the poor elderly in Peru. They use a multidimensional counting approach and do not focus on the impact of the Pension 65 program. Closest to our paper is the evaluation of the Pension 65 program by Bando et al. (2016) . They look at the intention-to-treat eect, rather than at the treatment eect and use a dierent econometric strategy to identify the eects of the Pension 65 program. Bando et al. (2016) analyze the impact of the program on dierent life dimensions separately without looking at an overall well-being measure. None of the papers on Peru have explicitly analyzed ethnic dierences. For Bolivia, however, Canavire Bacarreza et al. (2017) show that an unconditional cash transfer program has a larger eect on educational expenditures for indigenous than for non-indigenous recipients. Van de gaer et al. (2013) nd stronger eects of Mexico's Oportunidades Program on the health opportunities of children from indigenous backgrounds than on the health opportunities of children from non-indigenous backgrounds. Kant et al. (2014) investigate ethnic dierences in Canada on the basis of subjective well-being information, but they do not construct a preference-based well being measure.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the background about the ethnic dierences in Peru, the Pension 65 program, and the data set.
In Section 3, we show that the Pension 65 program has dierent eects on the three ethnic groups and most strikingly so for the Aymara. In Section 4, we investigate the latter nding in more detail and we will argue that the estimated preference dierences are consistent with our ndings. The resulting normative issues and our preference-based criterion for policy evaluation are discussed in Section 5. We nd that taking into account ethnic dierences in the conception of a good life is relevant for the evaluation of the Pension 65 program. Section 6 concludes. 4 2 Background and data
Measuring ethnicity in Peru
The complex interplay between ethnicity, exclusion, segregation, and race makes it dicult to dene and measure ethnicity in quantitative studies.
3 In Peru, ethnicity has functioned less as a basis for political organization than in other Latin American countries, although there seems to be a revival since the turn of the century (Sulmont, 2011) . Still, as elsewhere, being indigenous in Peru is associated with less education, less income, more poverty, less power, and more negative stigmatization.
In general, there are two main approaches to measure ethnicity. A rst approach is to use external observable characteristics such as mother tongue, physical characteristics, and place of origin.
4 Before 2017, Peru used mother tongue to demarcate between ethnic groups in its census (World Bank, 2015) . The most common languages learned during childhood are Spanish (81%), Quechua (17%), and Aymara (2%), though there are other languages spoken in the Peruvian jungle and in the low areas between the Andes and the jungle. Mother tongue has been the traditional criterion to distinguish ethnic groups in multilingual countries. It is a problematic criterion, however: many people with indigenous origin speak Spanish and many indigenous people of dierent ethnicity speak Quechua (Paredes, 2007 ).
An alternative approach based on self-identication with a particular ethnic group has become dominant in the recent literature.
The 2007 Peruvian census
sets the number of indigenous-language speakers at 4.4 million, whereas projections based on self-identication in household surveys yield an estimate of about 9.7 million indigenous persons (World Bank, 2015) .
6 This is not to say that the self-identication approach is without problems. In a context of discrimination, individuals may be reluctant to reveal their indigenous ethnic background and may prefer to report a more neutral background such as being Mestizo (mixed 4 The 19th century description of the Aymara Indians by Forbes (1870) compares at length the bodily measurements of the Aymara to people with a European or African background, for instance.
5 ILO Convention 169 (1989) supported this idea in its Article 1(2): Self-identication as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.
6 The 2017 census in Peru has used a self-identication approach. 5 background) to avoid the stigma of being non-white (Ñopo et al., 2004; PasquierDoumer and Risso Brandon, 2015) . As a consequence, ethnic identication can be inuenced by the relative numbers of indigenous people in the localities (Sulmont, 2011; Moreno, 2014) . Indigenous individuals living in urban areas, where stigmatization is more salient, may prefer to identify as Mestizo. In contrast, individuals living in the Andes and rural areas of Peru with a higher concentration of indigenous people may have less resistance identifying as indigenous.
Rapid urbanization in Peru makes ethnic identity particularly uid. This is particularly true for the Quechua, who have moved more often from rural areas to the cities, than for the Aymara, who remain mainly concentrated in the rural highlands of Southern Peru.
In the analysis of this paper, we follow the dominant approach in the literature and use self-identication to measure ethnicity.
7 Our aim is to identify groups with a strong identity, i.e., groups who share a specic view on what is important in life. It seems reasonable to assume that the individuals who have overcome stigmatization and self-identify as being indigenous, are the ones who show a stronger and more entrenched identity (see also Sulmont, 2011) .
The Pension 65 program
The non-contributory pension program Pension 65 has been introduced in October 2011 and is administered by the Ministry of Development and Social Inclusion of Peru (MIDIS). The program was rolled out between 2012 and 2014, and by 2015 it had reached about 500,000 Peruvians. The Pension 65 program is the second largest social program in Peru, behind the conditional cash transfer program Juntos .
The program has two components. First, beneciaries receive 250 Peruvian soles (about US$76) every two months. This transfer amounts to about 18% of the total expenditures of the targeted group before the intervention. In addition, beneciaries are eligible for the Integral Health Insurance Plan and they can receive care in public health facilities at no cost. Only individuals aged 65 or over, who are neither aliated to any pension system nor already receiving a pension, and who are living in a household classied as extremely poor by 7 There are exceptions to this trend. Pasquier-Doumer and Risso Brandon (2015) prefer to use language as the criterion, also because they focus on children. Canavire Bacarreza et al. In the SISFOH targeting system, every household obtains a score, which is unknown to them. A household's SISFOH score is a weighted average of a number of variables related to the material and socio-economic conditions of the household and its members.
8 Based on a comparison of their SISFOH score with region-specic poverty thresholds, households are classied into three categories: extremely poor, non-extremely poor, and non-poor. Only the rst category is eligible for the Pension 65 program. The SISFOH scores were determined before the thresholds were established, which avoids the possibility of manipulation (see Camacho and Conover, 2011) .
Data
We utilize data from the Survey of Health and Wellbeing of the Elderly (Encuesta de Salud y Bienestar del Adulto Mayor, or ESBAM) that was carried out in 2012 and 2015. 9 This panel data set is specically intended to study the was to obtain households located suciently close to the eligibility threshold for the Pension 65 program, such that they would be similar in all relevant dimensions except for the eligibility threshold itself. We say that individuals living in households located below or above the eligibility threshold fall into the treatment and control group, respectively.
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The sampling procedure of the data set is probabilistic, independent in each department, and stratied by rural and urban areas. It has been carried out in two steps. In the rst step, the primary sampling units in urban areas are the census units, in rural areas they coincide with villages with at least four households who are living in poverty and with at least one member older than 65. The selection probability of a primary sampling unit is proportional to the total number of households in the primary sampling unit. In the second step, four households were randomly drawn from each primary sampling unit. The We restrict the sample to the respondents who are eligible for the Pension 65 program (apart from the threshold), have no missing data and are present in both waves (more details can be found in the Appendix). We focus on the respondents who self-identify as belonging to one of the three largest ethnic groups in Peru: Mestizo, Quechua, and Aymara. Though most respondents identify themselves with the same ethnic group in both waves, some change group across waves. The Aymara tend to self-identify most consistently across both waves. Only 7% of the respondents who self-identify as Aymara in the 2012 wave have changed to another ethnic group in the follow-up. Respondents who self-identify as Quechua and Mestizo in the baseline have changed ethnic group more often: 21% and 27% respectively. Given our interest in studying well-being and preferences by ethnic groups, we restrict our sample to those respondents who answered consistently the same ethnic group in both waves.
11
Our nal sample is composed of 1,968 respondents who are observed in both waves, from which 1,233 (63%), 573 (29%) and 162 (8%) respondents are Mes-10 Unlike Bando et al. (2016) , we were not granted access to the SISFOH scores of the respondents. This prevents us from removing respondents from the sample with SISFOH scores that are outside the admissible range of 0.3 standard deviations above or below the threshold, as Bando et al. (2016, fn. 5 ) do in their main specication. However, the authors report that the removal of these respondents is not likely to aect the results.
11 We also implemented a robustness check with a sample including the cases of respondents identifying with one of the above three ethnic categories in one wave and answering don't know/no answer in the other wave. This did not change our ndings. tizo, Quechua and Aymara, respectively (see Table 1 The respondents who identify as Aymara live more in rural areas (the urbanization rate of the Aymara sub sample is below 10%, whereas it is around 40% for the other groups). As can be seen in Figure 1 , the Aymara live concentrated in the Altiplano region of Southern Peru, close to the Bolivian border and the Titicaca lake. Moreover, they live on average on a higher altitude (3900 km above sea-level), compared to the Quechua (3250 km) and Mestizo (1750 km).
Given the concentration of the Aymara in a few specic districts, it is dicult to disentangle the eect of ethnicity from locality for this group. Where needed, we will control for regional eects and altitude of the district in which the respondent lives.
3 The impact of the Pension 65 program 3.1 A rst glance at some key variables Let us start by looking at the ve important aspects of life that will play a central role in our analysis. food make up a large share of household expenditures (about 50%) and a high proportion of expenditure corresponds to self-consumption (about 23%). We use the logarithm of total household expenditures net of health expenditures, equivalized by the square root of the number of members in the household to correct for dierences in family composition. Between both waves, the average household size in our sample is reduced from 3.01 to 2.85 persons (with slightly smaller households for the Aymara subpopulation). As is clear from Table 2, expenditures increase for the treated Mestizo and Quechua, but not for the Aymara.
A health index is constructed based on the rst (polychoric) principal component of a battery of ve sub-dimensions of the 36-Item Short Form Survey (SF-36). We include physical functioning, physical role functioning, bodily pain, and general health as sub-dimensions.
13 The obtained principal component measure is normalized to an index between 0 and 100. Table 2 shows that the health of the treated Aymara has improved remarkably, despite the fact that all respondents have grown older between 2012 and 2015. We will call the remarkable health improvement for the treated Aymara, the Aymara miracle and we will return to it in Section 4.
A similar result is found for being free of limitations of activities of daily life (ADL), measured by the rst (polychoric) principal component of four questions that deal with crossing from one room to another, eating (including cutting food, serving glasses, etc.), going to toilet (seating and standing from toilet), and getting in and out of bed. Each of these questions is measured on a 3-point scale and the resulting measure is again normalized to an index between 0 and 100. Here also we see that the situation of the treated Aymara has improved.
The fourth dimension, respect, captures the quality of the relationship with relatives and is measured by the rst (polychoric) principal component of two questions: Do you consider that your relatives treat you with respect? and Do you consider that your relatives respect your opinions and interests?, each measured on a 5-point scale. The resulting measure is normalized to an index between 0 and 100. While this outcome is rather stable for Mestizo and Quechua, it increases for the Aymara, both in the control and in the treatment group.
Let us nally look at a measure of subjective well-being (SWB), based on seven 13 The SF-36, developed by the Rand institute, is widely used to assess health of adult respondents. The included dimensions form the physical health component of the SF-36. The emotional component of the SF-36 is not fully included in the ESBAM data set and not used in our analysis.
12 satisfaction questions (satisfaction with your health, yourself, your capacity to perform daily life activities, your personal relationships, the place where you live, your relationships with family, and your life as a whole). Each of these questions is measured on a 4-point scale. The rst (polychoric) principal component of these seven questions is normalized to obtain an index between 0 and 100. We see that the Aymara have a higher subjective well-being in 2015 compared to 2012, whereas subjective well-being is rather stable for the other two ethnic groups. Subjective well-being can be interpreted as an overall measure of wellbeing, capturing the subjective evaluation of one's situation on all relevant life dimensions. Alternatively, it can also be seen as one specic life dimension with the same status as the other dimensions. We come back to these dierent interpretations in Section 5. Table 2 shows that some outcomes remain relatively stable over time while others are changing, and that the trends dier across the ethnic groups. A more careful analysis is needed to see whether these changes are aected by the Pension 65 program or not. Indeed, the changes in the outcomes may have several causes.
The impact of the Pension 65 program
First, they may be caused by developments in the Peruvian society between 2012
and 2015, such as economic growth or policy changes unrelated to the Pension 65 program. Second, the panel is ageing. Over the considered period, average age increases from 71 to 74. This ageing is likely to impact the health of our respondents and the number of respondents who are able to work. Third, some changes may be caused by the initial dierences between the treated (extremely poor) and non-treated (non-extremely poor) Peruvians. Finally, some of the observed trends may indeed be an eect of the Pension 65 program.
To evaluate the eect of the Pension 65 program, we compare the trend of the outcomes for the control group and for the treatment group on either side of the eligibility threshold. To do that, we use a panel regression dierence-indierences approach with controls for some time-varying observable characteristics and individual xed eects to control for time-invariant (un)observable
where o it denotes an outcome variable (expenditures, health, ADL, respect or subjective well-being), z it a vector of time dependent characteristics of individual i (altitude of district, urban status, marital status, and work status), α i an individual xed eect, ε it an idiosyncratic error, and D2 and P 65 dummies of the second wave and the treatment respectively.
15 We are mainly interested in the treatment parameter η. First dierencing equation (1) yields
To capture potential heterogeneous treatment eects, we will interact the treatment parameter with ethnicity dummies. Moreover, we will mainly focus on the results interacting the time trend γ in equation (1) with ethnicity dummies to allow for heterogeneous time trends in the ethnic groups within the control group.
The treatment parameter can be consistently estimated by OLS if the treatment status is uncorrelated with changes in the idiosyncratic errors, i.e., if E(P 65 i ε i ) = 0. Given that the treatment decision on the basis of the SISFOH score may be correlated with some unobservable time varying characteristics, we cannot take it for granted that this assumption is satised.
To check the balancedness of treatment and control group, we perform a t-test of the dierences in the averages of some relevant variables between the control and treatment group in 2012. The results in Table 3 show that the respondents in the control group have signicantly larger average equivalized expenditures than the respondents in the treatment group (p < 0.000). As we can expect the SISFOH score (used to demarcate the treatment and control group) to be correlated with the expenditures, this result is not surprising. Other signicant dierences are found for the health index (p < 0.05), urban status (p < 0.000),
14 Bando et al. (2016) evaluate the program by comparing the outcomes in the follow-up, while controlling (linearly) for the distance to the eligibility threshold and regional xed eects. Note that in our specication the individual xed eect controls for all time-invariant factors, among which is the distance to the eligibility threshold (which is unobservable, but time-invariant).
15 As we don't observe when the respondents in the treatment group received the treatment for the rst time, we cannot distinguish between treated respondents to whom the program was rolled out early (in 2013) Tables 4 and 5 show the estimates of equation (2) for the ve considered aspects of life. For each aspect, the rst column provides an estimate of the overall treatment eect. The second column introduces interactions between the treatment dummy and the ethnicity dummies. In this case all non-treated respondents form the control group. The third column also introduces interactions between the time trend (i.e., the constant in our estimation in rst dierences) and the ethnicity dummies to allow for heterogeneous time trends in the ethnic groups within the control group. Comparing the three columns provides interesting 16 Bando et al. (2016) nd similar results when they test for the balancedness of the assignment to treatment and control groups.
(8) Figure 1 ), we introduce the logarithm of the altitude of the district in which the respondent is living as a control variable. This variable proxies for climatic and agricultural conditions,
and for the quality of the public infrastructure including health care provision.
Although these control variables are signicant in a few cases (e.g., moving
to a region at a higher altitude is negatively correlated with the change in expenditures and in ADL, and becoming unmarried likely becoming a widow or widower increases equivalized expenditures), dropping the controls from the regressions does not change the estimates of the treatment eects substantially.
Not surprisingly, being a beneciary of the Pension 65 program does have a positive eect (of slightly more than 10%) on equivalized expenditures (see column
(1) of Table 4 ). Yet, when looking at column (2) of Table 4 , we see that there is no such treatment eect for the Aymara in comparison to the entire control group. Indeed, the treatment eect for the Aymara (-0.032) is not signicantly dierent from 0 at any usual signicance level (p > 0.68). However, as column (3) shows, there is a signicant decrease in expenditures for the Aymara in the control group. Compared to this rened control group, the treatment eect for the treated Amayra becomes 0.344, which is signicant at any usual signicance level (p < 0.002). Whereas we witness lower expenditures in 2015 compared to 2012 for the Aymara in the control group, the Aymara in the treatment group were able to keep their expenditures more or less at the same level.
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More striking is the treatment eect on health: it is positive, but the simple model without interactions of column (4) masks an interesting heterogeneous eect across ethnic groups. In fact, we see in column (5) that the eect of the treatment on health is large and signicant for the Aymara (p < 0.000) compared to the total control group, but not signicantly positive for the other ethnic groups.
18 In column (6) we notice that also the health of the Aymara in the control group has increased, albeit at a much lower rate than for the Aymara 17 Based on the ESBAM data, it is impossible for us to distinguish whether consumed In column (10) to (12) of Table 5 , we see a pattern for the respect variable that is similar to the one of ADL. Column (11) shows a large eect of the intervention for Aymara that is signicantly dierent from zero (p < 0.01) when comparing to the total control group, and an insignicant eect for the other
groups. Yet, as we have seen already in Table 2 , respect also increases for the Aymara control group, in contrast to the Quechua and the Mestizo. This overall increase of respect for all Aymara could be explained by the position taken by elderly in the Aymara culture (remember that our sample grows three years older between 2012 and 2015). Moreover, the increased respect from relatives for the Aymara can also be explained by the fact that the treated groups give more material and economic support to persons close to them in their personal network. This hypothesis is supported by the results of Canavire Bacarreza et al.
(2017) who nd that indigenous grandparents in Bolivia spend a larger part of the unconditional transfer that they receive into educational expenditures for their grandchildren.
As mentioned before, subjective well-being can be seen as an additional life dimension or as a global measure of individual well-being, integrating the other dimensions. Our results for life satisfaction (column (13) to (15) Until now we looked at the dierent dimensions in isolation. In reality they are of course interrelated. Tables 6 and 7 show the results taking these in-
(8)
∆ Expend.
∆ Expend. Column (6) shows that this is not the case: for the Quechua as well as for the Aymara, SWB increases in the control group. This may be explained by the age eect, that is well known in the happiness literature, and it may also reect the position of the elderly in the indigenous groups. However, the Pension 65 treatment has no signicant eect on SWB after controlling for the other dimensions.
In the evaluation of the program, the SWB outcomes can be interpreted as a global measure of individual well-being, but they are not relevant as a separate dimension.
All-in-all, our analysis conrms that introducing ethnic dierences reveals interesting heterogeneous eects of the program that otherwise remain hidden.
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In Section 5 we will return to the normative implications of these ndings.
Is there an Aymara miracle?
The ndings in the previous section show that Pension 65 seems to have a positive eect on the health of the Aymara. For the other ethnic groups we witness increased expenditures and hardly any eect on the health index. Is 19 Bando et al. (2016) also nd that the Pension 65 program has a positive eect on total expenditures. They do not subtract health expenses to get at a net expenditures concept.
They nd no eect on (an arguably ad-hoc measure of ) physical health. Our health index is dened more broadly and we take ethnic dierences into account in a restricted sample. Since the positive eect on health in our result is driven by the performance of the Aymara, it is not surprising that a positive health eect is no longer found in their larger sample (where the Aymara are an even smaller minority). Contrary to our results, Bando et al. (2016) also nd a positive eect on subjective well-being. However, they measure subjective well-being by a depression scale, which is closer to health than our life satisfaction measure.
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it possible to explain these dierences? We will rst check the robustness of the remarkable increase in health for the Aymara. Then we will investigate whether the dierences may be explained by preference heterogeneity between the Aymara and the other ethnic groups, i.e., by a dierent view on the meaning of a good life.
Robustness of the Aymara miracle
In this section we present several robustness checks of the health increase of the Aymara subpopulation. First, one may wonder whether this nding is a mere artefact of the way in which we have constructed the health index. Recall that we have used (polychoric) principal component weights in the health index.
Yet, as Table 14 in Appendix shows, the Aymara score better on each of the four considered sub-dimensions of the SF-36, so the result is not sensitive to the weights given to these sub-dimensions in the constructed health index.
Moreover, a more detailed analysis of the ESBAM data set shows that the same sharp increase in health outcomes is found for other indicators as well. The last column of Table 14 shows that the Aymara suer less from nutritional deciency as measured by the mini nutritional assessment (MNA), whereas the score does not signicantly change for the Quechua (p > 0.80).
Note, furthermore, that Table 4 (column (6)) shows that the Aymara miracle extends to the ADL-index, which captures physical tness. The consistency between the results with the health and ADL indices softens -to some extentour worries about the lack of balance with respect to health in the assignment between control and treatment groups (as documented in Table 3 ). Indeed, this lack of balance is not found for the ADL-index.
Third, given the small sample of Aymara respondents, one may be concerned that our results are driven by a few outliers. Yet, similar patterns are found for the median and all other percentile values. The standard economic approach to health dierences focuses on opportunities and preferences. This framework oers a natural explanation to the Aymara miracle. Health cannot be bought directly on a market, but has to be produced by investments in health care, in time allocated to physical activities, in nutrition, etc. These investments have an opportunity cost in terms of expenditures.
In the popular Grossman model this leads to a downward sloping health production frontier that is represented by the full lines in Figure 3 (see, e.g., the analysis in Zweifel et al. (2009)).
For the sake of illustration we assume that the health production possibilities for Table 2 , for instance). In this interpretation, the interaction between dierences in preferences and dierences in the production frontier is the driving force behind our ndings. Preference dierences play an essential role.
We do not have the data to estimate a full structural model of health production by the households. We can, however, derive direct information about preferences from the estimation of a life satisfaction regression. At least since Clark and
Oswald (2002) and Van Praag and Baarsma (2005) , it has become standard practice to derive estimates of willingness-to-pay for non-market goods, i.e., marginal rates of substitution, from satisfaction equations.
21 Decancq et al. (2015a) discuss the crucial consistency assumption that is needed for this. This 20 Evidence shows that average life expectancy is 30 years shorter in the highlands than in Lima, for instance (World Bank, 2015) . For the sake of convenience, we rewrite eq. (1) for subjective well-being after having introduced the other life dimensions:
where SW B it is the subjective well-being index of respondent i in period t, y it is the expenditures variable and x it are the non-income dimensions (health, ADL, and respect). The vector z it contains some time-dependent control variables (altitude of district, urban status, marital status, and work status), D2 t is a dummy indicating the follow-up wave, P 65 i is the treatment dummy and ε it an idiosyncratic error. We are interested in retrieving information about the preferences over expenditures y it and non-income dimensions x it , i.e., in the coecients β and γ which determine the marginal rates of substitution. The other terms in equation (3) 
This is an extended version of eq. (2) that, as explained in section 3.2, can be estimated with standard OLS. Ordinal preference dierences between groups, to be distinguished from dierences in the response scale, can be captured by including interactions between the dimensions of well-being (expenditures, health, ADL, and respect) and the three ethnic groups. To arrive at a parsimonious model, we have started with a full set of all possible interactions, and then we dropped the least signicant interaction term from the model. We repeat this procedure until all remaining interactions are signicant at the 10% level. The results were already shown in columns (7)- (9) of Table 7 . As can be seen from column (9), only one interaction remains at the end: that is the interaction between the health index and the Aymara dummy.
The results in Table 7 are in line with results found in other satisfaction studies, including those with Peruvian data.
23 We focus on the results with dierentiated trends for the dierent control groups. All dimensions of life have a signicantly positive eect on the subjective well-being index. The signicant interaction eect for the Aymara suggests that they attach more importance to health than the other ethnic groups in our sample.
24 This dierence in preferences is further illustrated by the results in Table 8 , which shows the willingness-to-pay for a one point increase on a non-income dimension (measured on a 100-point scale), 23 GuillenRoyo (2008; emphasizes the importance of reference group consumption for life satisfaction. Our data are not rich enough to estimate such reference group eects.
Interestingly, however, she nds that reference groups do not matter for appraisal in the domain of physical health, which is largely made on the basis of the objective situation of the household.
24 Using alternative weighting schemes to the (polychoric) principal component weights used to construct the well-being index lead to similar results, even when satisfaction with health is removed from the set of considered domain satisfactions.
25 From equation (3) it follows that the willingness-to-pay can be computed as 100 × γ/β. 27 more (26.60 percent) to stay on the same indierence curve after an increase of their health index. Clearly, the marginal rate of substitution between health and expenditures is much larger for the Aymara than for the other groups.
The resulting steeper indierence curves are consistent with the hypothesized explanation in Figure 3 . The fact that the Aymara seem to have dierent preferences for health can be interpreted in many ways. One possibility is that these preferences reect deeper underlying cultural dierences, with the ideal of suma jakaña embodying more attention for the non-material dimensions of life (Calestani, 2009; Artaraz and Calestani, 2015) . Another interpretation of the Aymara preference for health could be that health (and a higher level of physical tness) has a larger instrumental value if one is living in harsher climatic circumstances and in an environment with a less developed infrastructure (as is the Altiplano region of Southern Peru).
Mestizo
26 These two interpretations can go perfectly hand-in-hand though.
Apart from the direct eect of the improved access to health care, there are other channels through which a larger preference for health may aect the impact of the Pension 65 program. The income transfer may allow beneciaries a shift to a healthier life style. As mentioned before, Table 14 in the Appendix shows that we see among the treated Aymara lower levels of nutritional deciency, as measured by their MNA score, which could reect a shift to food with a higher nutritional quality. Moreover, the improved access to health care may induce a greater awareness of health problems and an improvement of the information about health.
27 This latter channel is proposed by Bernal et al. (2017) as the 26 Already in the 19th century, Forbes (1870, p. 224) discusses a similar mechanism and observes that Aymara in the highlands of Bolivia and Peru enjoy a particularly robust health.
He argues that One great reason for this, however, is that, owing to the great mortality which takes place amongst the infants, a sort of natural selection asserts itself, and only the very strong children survive the rst few years after birth.
27 In line with the ndings of Bando et al. (2016, p. 11) , however, we nd no signicant 28 main explanation for the impact of expanding health insurance coverage through the Peruvian Integral Health Insurance Plan.
5 Ethnicity, preference dierences and program evaluation
The standard approach to evaluate a program is to look at the outcomes in one or several dimensions of well-being in isolation. Typically, the focus is on a monetary variable such as expenditures or income, but it can also be a health outcome or any other unidimensional outcome measure, see Bando et al. (2016) and Galiani et al. (2016) for examples. We have seen in Table 4 It is not obvious how to evaluate the overall eect of a program such as Pension 65 when it has dierent eects on the overall well-being of dierent subgroups, a fortiori when these subgroups have dierent preferences. In this section, we will discuss two normative criteria for program evaluation that are sensitive to preferences. These criteria are inspired by the recent literature on well-being measurement.
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Two normative criteria for program evaluation
A rst, obvious, possibility is to focus on a measure of subjective well-being.
This leads to the following normative criterion for program evaluation:
Subjective well-being criterion A program benets a recipient if she reports a higher subjective well-being after the introduction of the program.
This criterion has appealing features. It is sensitive to preference dierences between ethnic groups or individuals in general. Indeed, if there are ethnic differences in the valuation of the dierent dimensions of life, they will be reected eect of the Pension 65 program on the use of health services.
28 A elaborate discussion of dierent approaches to measuring well-being can be found in Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) ; Decancq et al. (2015b) ; Adler and Fleurbaey (2016) .
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in the measure of subjective well-being (under the consistency assumption that the measure of subjective well-being tracks the preferences of the respondents). Table 7 gives an example of how a measure of subjective well-being captures the valuation of the dierent dimensions of life. Moreover, the criterion is easy to implement. In the notation of the previous section, testing this criterion boils down to checking whether the subjective well-being index has increased, i.e., to check whether ∆SW B i > 0.
However, the subjective well-being criterion has also some normative drawbacks.
The most important is that measures of subjective well-being do not only capture the outcomes in the dierent dimensions of life as weighted by preferences, but they also reect the dierences that are due to changing aspirations and expectations, or to mere individual idiosyncrasies in the use of the response scale. Since the individual prefers a better health, the program has brought her to a worse bundle according to her preferences. Yet, it is possible that she adapts to her new situation with lower health and reaches the same subjective well-being level as before: she would still prefer to return to the situation 2015, but her subjective well-being has returned to its original level.
Ultimately, it is a normative question whether we want to take up dierences in aspirations when evaluating a program. If one thinks that the objective 29 Our argument echoes the discussion of physical-condition neglect by Sen (1985, p. 21 ).
Sen argues A person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and ill can still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulllment if he or she has learned to have`realistic' desires and to take pleasure in small mercies.
situation as evaluated by the ordinal preferences rather than the subjective evaluation is what matters to evaluate a program, the subjective well-being criterion is not attractive. The following preference-based criterion presents a natural alternative.
Preference-based criterion A program benets a recipient if she is lifted to a higher indierence curve after the introduction of the program.
This criterion is indeed very natural, to the extent that it will seem almost tautological for economists. It is ethically very robust: all well-being measures that are based on the information of ordinal preferences alone, are consistent with the proposed preference-based criterion. Whenever the preference-based criterion classies a program as benecial, the so-called equivalent income measure will increase, for instance, as well as all quantity-metric and money-metric wellbeing measures as discussed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980, pp. 179-182) ).
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What all these well-being measures essentially do is attach interpersonally comparable numerical labels to the indierence curves of the respondents, so that higher well-being is observed on higher indierence curves. As there is no consensus in the literature about the attractiveness of dierent ways to attach labels to indierence curves, we take a more robust approach here and limit ourselves to ordinal preference information. This robustness comes at a price, however.
The proposed criterion is able to tell us whether the program was benecial or not, but it does not provide us with an exact quantication of how much the program has beneted the person at hand. For the purpose of our analysis here, such a quantication is not needed.
The analysis in the previous section suggests an easy test for the criterion.
31
Individual i will reach a higher indierence curve if (β ln(y i ) + γ x i ) > 0.
Equation (3) illustrates the dierence between the subjective well-being criterion and the preference-based criterion. The subjective well-being criterion looks at the evolution of the subjective well-being index over time. This evolution is sensitive to changes in observable controls, the time trend, and changes in the idiosyncratic error term, as well as the ordinal preferences. The preferencebased criterion, on the other hand, is only sensitive to the ordinal preferences of the respondents.
30 On equivalent incomes, see Decancq et al. (2015a Decancq et al. ( , 2017 . Samuelson (1977); Deaton (1979); Fleurbaey and Tadenuma (2014) provide examples of quantity metric well-being measures, Samuelson (1974); Bosmans et al. (2018) provide examples of money metrics. For recent surveys, see Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011); Fleurbaey and Blanchet (2013) .
31 Alternative methods to estimate preferences are based on observed behavior (revealed preferences) or contingent valuation or discrete choice experiments (stated preferences).
We mentioned earlier the interesting possibility to include individual happiness as a separate life dimension. Sen (1985, p. 17) argues that It would be odd to claim that a person broken down by pain and misery is doing very well.
However, with the approach to estimate preferences used here, determining the relative weight of happiness (the marginal rate of substitution between happiness and the other dimensions of life) would only be possible if we had an independent measure of feelings of happiness that does not coincide (or is not spuriously correlated) with the subjective well-being index. It seems unlikely that such a measure of emotions could be constructed on the basis of a direct survey question alone. Alternatives could be based on experience sampling or day reconstruction (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006) or preferences over feelings of happiness could be directly elicited in binary choices, see Benjamin et al. (2012) ; Adler et al. (2017) . Unfortunately, neither a direct measure of feelings of happiness, nor a battery of binary choices is available in the ESBAM data. Moreover, as we have seen, the results in Table 7 suggest that the treatment has no independent eect on life satisfaction, after controlling for the other dimensions of life.
Evaluating the Pension 65 program
We now apply the normative criteria to the Pension 65 program. Using the coecient estimates from column (9) of Table 7 , Table 9 The next two rows of Table 9 focus on the summary criteria. Interestingly, we see that a majority of all groups report a higher subjective well-being, whereas only for the Amayra a majority reaches a higher indierence curve. When we focus on the control group of the Quechua, we see a remarkable dierence between both measures: less than 40% of this group has moved to a higher indierence curve, but about 55% report a higher subjective well-being. This nding suggests that between 2012 and 2015 this group has substantially adjusted their frame of reference. This is consistent with the so-called satisfaction paradox that is found in ageing studies, see, e.g., Stone et al. (2010) ; Gana et al. (2012) . In order to quantify the impact of the Pension 65 program on the probability of moving to a higher indierence curve, we use a dierence-in-dierences method in the same spirit as the one used in Section 3. We now estimate a logit model in which the binary dependent variable takes the value of 1 when the individuals have moved to a higher or equal indierence curve, and 0 otherwise. The results are given in Table 11 . We see in column (1) that, overall, the Pension 65
Higher indierence curve Robust standard errors in parentheses. * < 0.10, * * < 0.05 , * * * < 0.01 Table 11 : Dierence-in-dierence estimation of the eect of the Pension 65
program on the likeliness to move to a higher indierence curve (logit model)
program treatment has a signicantly positive eect on its beneciaries. Column (2) shows that the positive eect is more pronounced for the Aymara when comparing to the total control group. When allowing for heterogeneous time trends across the ethnic groups in the control group (in column (3)), we see that the Aymara in the control group have also moved to a higher indierence curve.
The point estimate of the additional eect of the treatment on the Aymara is positive, but not signicantly so (p > 0.25). Again, leaving out the large variability in the subjective well-being index that is due to changes in the frame of reference or individual idiosyncrasies does change the results. At a more basic level, we believe that it is necessary to develop better methods of measuring individual preferences for non-market commodities (such as health and respect). In addition to methods based on revealed preferences and life satisfaction regressions, attention should also be given to contingent valuation and other stated preferences techniques. Better identication of preferences for non-market commodities is a conditio sine qua non for the development of methods for policy evaluation that are based on the ordinal preferences of the people involved.
Sample selection
We construct the nal sample as follows (see Table 12 ). We start from an Detailed health variables Robust standard errors in parentheses. * < 0.10, * * < 0.05 , * * * < 0.01 
